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To be agents or not to be agents, that is the question:  
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ABSTRACT: In recent years, practitioners, commentators and competition authori-
ties have been facing the question of whether online platforms fit the mould of a typi-
cal agent under EU competition law. The stakes are high. If online platforms could 
be qualified as agents, obligations imposed on them in relation to the contracts con-
cluded and/or negotiated on behalf of their principal(s) might fall outside Article 
101 (1) TFEU. 
This article wishes to contribute to the debate in two ways. First, it offers an assess-
ment on whether, under existing EU competition law, online platforms can be quali-
fied as agents. Second, it provides a conceptual framework to determine whether the 
existing rules are fit for purpose. 
After a brief overview of the relevant case-law, the article finds that, as a matter of 
current law, online platforms can fall under the definition of agents. However, exist-
ing rules should be updated to reflect the disruptive changes brought by the online 
platform revolution, since they were conceived at a time when value was created and 
transferred following the traditional value chain (or pipeline) model: value flew in a 
linear way from producers to consumers. Yet, companies are nowadays increasingly 
shifting from the value chain model to a more complex business model, i.e. the plat-
form model, which has re-shaped ordinary competitive dynamics. Under the plat-
form model, value is created through a complex array of interactions among produc-
ers, principals, consumers and online platforms. The output is a package of products 
and services. Online platforms compete with each other, with other market players 
and sometimes even with their principals. In our view, these new challenges are not 
* Date of reception: 17 July 2020. Data of acceptance: 25 August 2020.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.34632/mclawreview.2020.9526.
** Ph.D. at Roma Tre University, Rome, Italy (2018); LL.M. at Brussels School of Competition, 
Brussels, Belgium (2020); Lawyer at Latham & Watkins, LLP. lucavillani07@gmail.com. The opin-
ions expressed in this article are those of the author.
M&CLR_IV_2.indd   75 28/10/2020   23:06:51
76  Market and Competition Law Review / volume iv / no. 2 / october 2020 / 75-111
adequately addressed by the EU Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, which should be 
reviewed accordingly to catch up with the online platform revolution. 
KEYWORDS: Vertical restraints; agency agreements; guidelines on vertical restraints; 
online sales; online platforms.
1. Introduction
Online platforms are under the spotlight of the European Commission 
(“EC” or “Commission”).1 This comes as no surprise – the benefits of the 
online platform economy are as many as the challenges it poses. 
Competition law is called to a difficult task. The emergence of online 
platforms has profoundly impacted competition policy and has forced 
the Commission to consider whether its toolkit is fit for purpose. A num-
ber of online platforms are being prosecuted for alleged competition law 
infringements. Conducts under investigation include data leveraging, 
geo-blocking and data collection practices.2 Many more investigations are 
reported to be imminent. Sector inquiries on online platforms are being 
launched throughout the world.3 In parallel, the Commission is stepping 
up its efforts to tackle so-called “gatekeeping platforms”.4 
1 Further information on the Commission’s initiatives involving online platforms can be found 
at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/online-platforms-digital-single-market. The 
Commission also established an Observatory on the Online Platform Economy. The Observatory 
monitors and analyses the latest trends and data in the online platform economy and has a dedi-
cated website. Further information can be found at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/
eu-observatory-online-platform-economy. 
2 See for instance the ongoing investigations involving Valve (See https://ec.europa.eu/commis-
sion/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_2010#:~:text=The%20Commission%20opened%20formal%20
antitrust,publishers%20on%202%20February%202017.&text=A%20Statement%20of%20
Objections%20is,violations%20of%20EU%20antitrust%20rules for the press release following the 
Statements of Objections) and Amazon (See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/
mt/ip_19_4291 for the press release following the opening of the investigation). 
3 For instance, the CMA published the interim report of its investigation into Online 
platforms and digital advertising (available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
media/5dfa0580ed915d0933009761/Interim_report.pdf); the Australian competition authority 
published the final report of its Digital Platforms Inquiry (available at https://www.accc.gov.au/
publications/digital-platforms-inquiry-final-report). 
4 For a brief description of the initiatives aimed at tackling gatekeeping platforms, see 
Commissioner Vestager’s speech during ASCOLA Annual Conference of 26 June 2020, available 
at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2019-2024/vestager/announcements/compe-
tition-digital-age-changing-enforcement-changing-times_en. 
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This is the natural consequence of the “online platform revolution”5 or 
“platformisation” of our economy.6
We believe that this fast-paced evolution of competition law enforcement 
in the digital sphere has led researchers and policy makers to be over-ori-
ented to specific novel issues. This came at the expense of building a robust 
legal framework for the analysis of vertical agreements involving online 
platforms. There are very few, albeit meaningful, exceptions.7
This article aims at fostering the debate on one particular aspect of the 
relationship between online platforms and the EU rules on vertical agree-
ments, namely whether online platforms can be considered agents under 
EU competition law, focusing therefore on online transaction platforms 
that employ a commission-based business model. For the purposes of this 
article, transaction platforms are those facilitating online buying and sell-
ing between providers and their customers. Under the commission-based 
business model, platforms charge a commission for each transaction they 
facilitate. The commission can either be a percentage of the transaction 
value or a flat fee. 
5 See Geoffrey G. Parker, Marshall W. Van Alstyne and Sangeet Paul Choudary, Platform 
Revolution: How Networked Markets are Transforming the Economy – And How to Make Them 
Work for You (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2017).
6 See Josefine Hedeström and Luc Peeperkorn, “Vertical restraints in on-line sales: Comments on 
some recent developments”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 7, no.1 (2015): 10-23.
7 See in chronological order Pinar Akman, “Online platforms, agency, and competition law: Mind 
the Gap”, Fordham International Law Journal 43, no. 2 (2019): 209-319; Nelson Jung, “European 
Union – Restrictions of online sales, including geo-blocking and geo-filtering”, Global Competition 
Review – E-Commerce Competition Enforcement Guide, 2019, https://globalcompetitionreview.
com/guide/e-commerce-competition-enforcement-guide/second-edition/article/european-
union-restrictions-of-online-sales-including-geo-blocking-and-geo-filtering; Charlotte Breuvart 
and Yannis Schlüter, “Disrupting the traditional value chain: How online platforms challenge 
competition rules on vertical restraints and RPM”, Concurrences, no. 2 (2019); Lars Kjølbye, Alessio 
Aresu and Sophia Stepanou, “The Commission’s e-commerce sector inquiry – Analysis of legal 
issues and suggested practical approach”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 6, no. 
7 (2015): 465; Ioannis Kokkoris, “Expedia and Booking.com: Agent or distributor?”, Competition 
Policy International, 2013, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/expedia-and-book-
ing-com-agent-or-distributor/; Matthew Bennet, “Online platforms: Retailers, genuine agents or 
none of the above?”, Competition Policy International, 2013, https://www.competitionpolicyinter-
national.com/online-platforms-retailers-genuine-agents-or-none-of-the-above/.
For a comprehensive assessment of EU competition law rules on vertical agreements, see Frank 
Wijckmans and Filip Tuytschaever, Vertical Agreements in EU Competition Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018); Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay, The EU Law of Competition (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014); Vito Auricchio, Matteo Padellaro and Paolo Tomassi, Gli Accordi 
di Distribuzione Commerciale nel Diritto della Concorrenza (Padova: CEDAM, 2013).
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From a legal perspective, this type of platforms often operates through 
agency-types contracts – the platform facilitates transactions between (a 
multitude of) principals and customers in exchange for the commission. 
The issue of whether these platforms can be qualified as agents under 
EU competition law is highly intricate. This is because “traditionally, 
retailers can be either independent or a pure agent of the manufacturer. 
However, platforms do not fit either of these categories neatly since they 
have the characteristics of both agents and independent retailers at the 
same time”.8
Providing an answer to the issue is of paramount importance to ensure 
legal certainty when assessing agreements involving online platforms. If 
online platforms could be considered agents, they would benefit from the 
more lenient regime provided by the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints 
(“Guidelines”).9 Yet, the applicable legal framework provides limited 
guidance. This has been recently highlighted in the Commission staff 
working document evaluation of the vertical block exemption regula-
tion (“VBER”),10 which confirms that “the main concern that arises from 
the evaluation is the fact that the VBER and the Vertical Guidelines are 
not well adapted to the market developments that took place since the 
adoption of the rules, notably the growth of online sales and of new 
market players such as online platforms. Both developments raise issue 
[…] these include […] the assessment of agency agreements […] these 
issues […] should be taken into account in any next steps following the 
evaluation”.11
Market players, practitioners and competition authorities are thus strug-
gling to come to a satisfactory solution to the issue. Three schools of thought 
are facing each other. Some commentators argue that, normally, online 
platforms cannot be qualified as agents. This is because online platforms 
are said to bear significant risks, with particular regard to market specific 
investments.12 Other commentators come to the same conclusion through 
a different avenue. They argue that the Guidelines have unduly foregone 
the so-called “integration criterion” – given the market power that some 
online platforms manage to enjoy, they cannot be considered auxiliary 
8 Breuvart and Schlüter, “Disrupting”, 4.
9 See Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ C 130, 19 May 2010.
10 See SWD(2020) 173 final.
11 See page 92.
12 See for instance Hedestrom and Peeperkorn, “Vertical restraints”.
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to their principals and therefore cannot qualify as agents.13 Finally, other 
Authors argue that online platforms can be considered agents under the 
Guidelines. According to this line of thought, the integration criterion 
bears no relevance to the assessment and online platforms do not bear 
significant risks on the market for the contract products or services.14
Our view is that, as a matter of current law, online platforms can be 
qualified as agents. However, the existing rules appear to be formalistic 
and by now outdated. The upcoming review of the Guidelines and of the 
VBER is an opportunity not to be missed to revamp the relevant rules. Our 
assessment is premised on the following pillars:
i. Online platforms are highly differentiated. Each of them has specific 
features and incentives. The assessment on whether an online plat-
form can qualify as an agent under EU competition law has to be 
performed on a case-by-case basis. 
ii. Under the Guidelines, the so-called “integration criterion” bears 
no relevance to the assessment. The assessment is exclusively based 
on the financial or commercial risk born by the agent. In our view, 
the risk-centered approach embraced by the Guidelines entails that 
online platforms can be qualified as agents. In our view, most of 
the times online platforms do not bear the financial or commercial 
risks that are given relevance by the Guidelines. Arguing otherwise 
means over-stretching the boundaries of the notion of risk. 
iii. We think that the debate on the integration criterion is of limited 
relevance. While it is true that the Guidelines overlooked case-law of 
the European Court of Justice (“ECJ” or the “Court”), we doubt that 
the integration criterion would do the trick. 
iv. The test provided by the Guidelines is formalistic and outdated. 
First, they rely on a number of form-based categories like the one 
of agency. This is not in line with the evolutionary path of compe-
tition law and fails to capture the specificities of online platforms. 
Furthermore, they are modelled upon a traditional value chain 
13 See for instance Pierre Goffinet and Frédéric Puel, “Vertical relationships: The Impact of the 
internet on the qualification of agency agreements”, Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice 6, no. 4 (2015): 242. 
14 Pinar Akman, “Online platforms”, and “A competition law assessment of platform most-
favoured-customer clauses”, Journal of Competition Law & Economics 12, no. 4 (2016), convinc-
ingly argues the same.
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model. The online platforms’ business model is much more com-
plicated. The mere fact that the taxonomy of agency agreements 
has been left unchanged since 1962 should suggest that it is time to 
recast the relevant rules.
Before diving into the legal assessment, we believe it is helpful to briefly 
discuss the reasons why online platforms are challenging the tenets of 
competition law, with particular regard to agency agreements.
The Stigler report refers to the rise of online platforms as “one of the key 
defining factors of the past decade”.15 The impact of online platforms on 
competition has been described in many different ways. Well-known offi-
cials of the EC included “platformisation” among the most distinguishing 
evolutionary trends in on-line competition.16 Books have been written on 
the “platform revolution”.17
Online platforms have indeed exercised a disruptive influence on soci-
ety. This is well portrayed in the Stigler report, according to which online 
platforms changed the way “we work, study, travel, communicate, shop 
and even date”. In parallel, online platforms play an increasingly impor-
tant role in economic growth. They foster innovation and help enhance 
the choice of goods and services, thus contributing to consumer welfare. 
From a competition standpoint, online platforms have brought about a 
new way to create value. In economic terms, value is the “amount buyers 
are willing to pay for what a firm provides them”.18 Creating value “that 
exceeds the cost of doing so is the goal of any [business] strategy”.
In traditional business management, the set of activities performed by 
each market operator in order to create value and the interactions between 
those activities is referred to as “value chain”. The father of the value chain 
theory is Professor Michal Porter, who first addressed the issue in 1985. 
According to Professor Porter, a value chain is the set of strategically rel-
evant activities performed by a certain market operator to create value. 
Value chains are made of so-called “value activities”, i.e. “the physically and 
technologically distinct activities a firm performs. These are the building 
15 See Luigi Zingales and Filippo Maria Lancieri, “Stigler committee on digital platforms: Policy 
brief”, Stiegler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State (Chicago), 2019, 6.
16 Hedeström and Peeperkorn, “Vertical restraints”, 17
17 See Parker, Van Alstyne and Choudary, Platform Revolution.
18 See for instance Michael E. Porter, Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior 
Performance (New York: NY Free Press, 1985) and David Barnes, Understanding Business: 
Processes, (Brighton: Psychology Press, 2001). 
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blocks by which a firm creates a product valuable to its buyers”. According 
to Professor Porter, “each value activity employs purchased inputs, human 
resources (labor and management), and some form of technology to per-
form its function”.
The idea is that productive input is pushed down the supplier’s value 
chain to be processed. By doing so, suppliers create upstream value. 
Suppliers’ output is then pushed further down through the value chain of 
distributors, and then through the value chain of buyers, all the way down 
to end customers. The sum of suppliers’, distributors’ and buyers’ value 
chains is what Professor Porter calls a value system. In such a system, value 
is created and transferred in a linear way – value flows from the supplier to 
the customer following a straight line, and each market operator contrib-
utes by adding its own portion of value. 
Professor Porter’s model is the cornerstone of modern business man-
agement theories, and rightly so. It captures traditional market dynam-
ics across several industries. The draftsmen of the Guidelines had this 
standardised, linear value chain model in mind. That is the reason why the 
Guidelines proved to be time-resistant and managed to cover so many dif-
ferent business models. However, we also believe this is the reason why the 
Guidelines start showing signs of age when it comes to online platforms. 
The most distinguishing feature of the platformisation of modern econ-
omy is in fact that online platforms do not fit the mould of the traditional 
value chain (or value system) theories. 
Under the traditional value chain model, the end product is the key 
driver of value. This is not the case in the world of online platforms. The 
key driver of value is often a package of services resulting from diagonal 
interactions among entities that exchange value through the platform. It is 
what Hedeström and Peeperkorn called “service-isation” of our economy.19 
A good example is provided by modern gaming platforms, i.e. online plat-
forms where users can purchase videogames that are sold by publishers/
developers and play the game while benefitting from the platform’s addi-
tional features. These platforms offer gamers an all-encompassing experi-
ence made of multi-players mode, instant messaging systems and many 
more game improvement features. The platform thus becomes the forum 
where games developers, gamers and service providers meet and exchange 
19 Hedeström and Peeperkorn, “Vertical restraints”, 16. According to these Authors, “one charac-
teristic of on-line selling is that it tends to promote a shift from the ‘proprietary economy’ (where 
goods change ownership) towards an ‘access economy’ (where consumers buy access to services)”.
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value. The end product offered by the platform is not the video-game – it is 
a complex experience that includes a number of services. The same applies 
to other economic sectors, such as the sale of hotel rooms.
The immediate consequence of the above is that the traditional value 
system in which one supplier interacts with its downstream counterpar-
ties is being replaced by a new paradigm in which an unprecedented 
number of suppliers has multiple, simultaneous and mutual relation-
ships with a wide array of entities by means of a single entity, i.e. the 
online platform. 
This phenomenon is well described by Parker, Van Alstyne and Choudary. 
According to the authors, the traditional business model works as a pipe-
line – “a pipeline is a business that employs a step-by-step arrangement for 
creating and transferring value, with producers at one end and consumers 
at the other”. The authors further note that “in recent years […] the simple 
pipeline arrangement [has been] transformed into a complex relationship 
in which producers, consumers and the platforms themselves enter into 
a variable set of relationships. In the world of platforms, different types 
of users – some of them producers, some of them consumers, and some 
of them people who may play both roles at various times – connect and 
conduct interactions with one another”. In sum, “rather than flowing in a 
straight line from producers to consumers, value can be created, changed, 
exchanged and consumed in a variety of ways and places, all made possible 
by the connections that the platform facilitates”.
From a competition law standpoint, this means that enforcers can-
not adopt a standardised approach when assessing competitive dynam-
ics involving online platforms. A case-by-case assessment is required to 
capture the specificities of the competitively relevant interactions that are 
going on.
Furthermore, the ubiquitous nature of online platforms acts as a mul-
tiplier of the relevant competitive dynamics. Online platforms compete 
among themselves. They sometimes compete with their partners. They 
compete with off-line rivals. Meanwhile, partners compete among them-
selves, can compete with the platform and can multi-home among dif-
ferent platforms. As a result, when dealing with vertical relationships 
involving online platforms, competition authorities must safeguard not 
only competition among merchants (or principals), but also among plat-
forms. To borrow from the agency jargon, competition authorities must 
be in the position to ensure that competition on the price that online 
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platforms charge for their services, i.e. competition on the commission, 
is protected. 
Finally, online platforms can benefit from significant network effects. 
The high number of interactions facilitated by the platform, coupled 
with network effects, can cause platforms to grow at a significant pace. It 
is indeed increasingly frequent that online platforms manage to enlarge 
to the point that they can behave independently from the entities they 
intermediate. In competition law terms, this means that online platforms 
sometimes get to enjoy a higher degree of market power than the entities 
they put in contact. As a result, online platforms can often determine their 
conduct on the market in an independent way.
Each of these topics will be factored into the legal assessment below. To 
do so, we will first provide an overview of the treatment of agency agree-
ments under the Guidelines and the early case-law (Section 2). We will 
then apply such principles to agency agreements (Section 3). Finally, we 
will try to suggest a possible way forward in the context of the upcoming 
review of the Guidelines (Section 4).
2. Agency Agreements Under EU competition law
2.1. Agency agreements under the Guidelines. The ‘risk criterion’
Part II of the Guidelines sets out the principles applicable to vertical agree-
ments which “generally fall outside the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU”, 
namely de minimis agreements, agency agreements and subcontracting 
agreements. Agency agreements are addressed under section 2, para-
graphs 12-21. Paragraphs 12-14 set out the two “constituent elements”20 of 
the EU competition law notion of agent. 
First, an intermediary can be qualified as an agent if it is vested with the 
power to negotiate and/or conclude contracts on behalf of the principal, 
either in the agent’s own name or in the name of the principal, for the pur-
chase or sale of goods or services by or from the principal.21
Second, the “determining factor” in defining an agency agreement is the 
“financial or commercial risk borne by the agent in relation to the activi-
ties for which it has been appointed as an agent by the principal”. It is 
not material for the assessment “whether the agent acts for one or several 
20 Expression used by Wijckmans and Tuytschaever, “Vertical agreements”, 299.
21 Guidelines, paragraph 12.
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principals”.22 In so doing, the Guidelines anchor the notion of agent to the 
one of “financial or commercial risk”. 
The impact of a pure risk-based assessment for the purposes of this arti-
cle will be discussed in Section 3 – at this stage, it suffices to emphasise 
that the Guidelines leave no room for doubts. The key factor is the (degree 
of) financial or commercial risk borne by the agent. This the so-called 
“integration criterion” leaves out of the picture. According to the integra-
tion criterion, an agent can be considered as such if it is integrated within 
its principal’s business organisation. Until the Nineties, the risk criterion 
and the integration criterion complemented each other. However, the 2000 
vertical guidelines made a U-turn and deprived the integration criterion 
of any relevance. Yet, as discussed in Section 1, some of the commentators 
argue that the integration criterion should be factored into the assessment 
to cope with the platformisation of competition law. 
There are three types of financial or commercial risks that are “mate-
rial to the definition of an agency agreement” under the Guidelines. First, 
there are “contract-specific risks”. These are risks “directly related to the 
contracts concluded and/or negotiated by the agent on behalf of the prin-
cipal”. Second, there are “market-specific investments”. These are invest-
ments “specifically required for the type of activity for which the agent has 
been appointed by the principal, that is, which are required to enable the 
agent to conclude and/or negotiate this type of contract”. These invest-
ments are usually sunk. Third, there are “risks related to other activities 
undertaken by the agent on the same product market”, such as after-sale 
services, to the extent such activities are requested by the principal.23
22 Guidelines, paragraph 13. 
Angela Huyue Zhang, “Toward an economic approach to agency agreements”, King’s College 
London Legal Studies Research Paper Series, no. 2013-5, 5 argued that “the prevailing approach 
adopted […] in the EU for dealing with the issue of ‘genuine’ agency is ill-focused”. According to 
Zhang, “the real question to ask is not whether the agent has incurred any specific cost or risk, but 
rather whether agency, rather than distribution, is a more efficient form to organize distribution 
functions between the contracting parties”. This Author draws upon Judge Posner’s opinion in the 
US Morrison case, i.e. Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430 (7th Cir. 1986). This was a typi-
cal RPM case – the parties argued that their relationship was one of agency and therefore price fix-
ing obligations fell outside the scope of application of antitrust rules. Judge Posner considered that 
the key issue was to determine whether the establishment of an agency agreement was conceived 
to circumvent the rule against price fixing or whether this was motivated by efficiency reasons in 
setting up a distribution system. In that case, given that there was no evidence of the circumven-
tion rationale, the agreement was found not to constitute unlawful RPM.
23 Guidelines, paragraph 14.
M&CLR_IV_2.indd   84 28/10/2020   23:06:51
85To be agents or not to be agents, that is the question | Luca Villani
According to the Guidelines, an agent can be qualified as such under EU 
competition law if it does not bear any of these risks, or only bears insig-
nificant risks, in relation to the contracts concluded and/or negotiated on 
behalf of the principal. On the other hand, the risks related to the provision 
of agency services are not material to the assessment.24 This is key for the 
purposes of this article – it is necessary to distinguish between the market 
for the contract products or services and the one for agency services. On 
the market for agency services, the agent acts as an ordinary undertaking 
– it offers its agency services in exchange for the commission and competes 
with other agents. Competition among agents is usually driven by the level 
of commission and by the quality of the agency services provided. The risks 
incurred by the agent to become more competitive on the market for agency 
services are not material to the assessment. The opposite is true when it 
comes to the market for the contract products or services – on such mar-
ket, the agent acts as an extension of its principal(s). Its task is to place the 
principal’s products or services on the market. The risks borne by the agent 
to do so are material to the assessment. If the intermediary bears the risks 
arising from the sale of the contract products or services, it becomes a dis-
tinct competitive entity on the market and falls outside the notion of agent.
The Guidelines further clarify that an agreement will normally be con-
sidered an agency agreement when the property in the contract goods 
bought or sold by the agent does not vest in the agent, or where the agent (i) 
does not contribute to the costs relating to the supply/purchase of the con-
tract goods or services, including transport costs, (ii) does not maintain 
at its own cost or risk stocks of the contract goods and can return unsold 
goods to the principal without charge, (iii) does not undertake responsibil-
ity towards third parties for damage caused by the product sold, (iv) does 
not take responsibility for customers’ non-performance of the contract,25 
(v) is not obliged to invest in sales promotion, (vi) does not make market-
specific investments in equipment, premises or training of personnel, and/
or (vii) does not undertake other activities within the same product market 
required by the principal.26
24 Guidelines, paragraph 15. 
25 Goffinet and Puel, “Impact of the internet”, 244 consider that this is true “with the exception of 
the loss of the agent’s commission, unless the agent is liable for fault […] for example, if an agent 
in the travel sector bears the risk of losing its commission in case of cancellation of a booking, the 
contract will still be considered as an agency agreement under EU competition law”.
26 Guidelines, paragraph 16.
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If an agreement amounts to one of agency, all the obligations “imposed 
on the agent in relation to the contracts concluded and/or negotiated on 
behalf of the principal fall outside Article 101 (1) TFEU”.27 In particular, (i) 
limitations on the territory in which the agent may sell goods or services; 
(ii) limitations on the customers to whom the agent may sell these goods or 
services and (iii) the prices and conditions at which the agent must sell or 
purchase these goods or services are considered to form part of the agency 
agreement and thus fall outside the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU.
The rationale underpinning this favourable treatment is that “the selling 
or purchasing function of the agent forms part of the principal’s activi-
ties” – the obligations imposed by the principal on the agent are “essential 
[because] the principal is [taking] the risks and therefore [it must be] in a 
position to determine the commercial strategy”.28 As Jones and Sufrin put 
it, “the close economic links existing in the agency relationship may mean 
that an agent is so closely interrelated with its principal that, as with the 
relationship between a parent and a subsidiary, the agent forms an integral 
part of the principal’s business and the relationship is characterized by 
economic unity”.29 Odudu and Bailey rightly point out that “the agent acts 
as the behest of the principal and is incapable of competing with its prin-
cipal”. According to the Authors, “the absence of risk shows that the agent 
has no presence on the market that is independent from the principal”.30 
On the other hand, the agent is “a separate undertaking from the prin-
cipal” on the market for agency services, i.e. it does not “form part of the 
principal’s activities”.31 This is because on the market for agency services 
there is no “close economic link” between the principal and its agent – the 
agent is a separate entity that engages in competitively relevant interac-
tions with the principal and with other agents. It follows that the obliga-
tions imposed on the agent (or on the principal) outside the context of the 
contracts concluded and/or negotiated on behalf of the principal, such as 
exclusive agency or single branding provisions, must be assessed under 
Article 101 TFEU.32
27 Guidelines, paragraph 18.
28 Guidelines, paragraph 18.
29 Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 634.
30 Okeoghene Odudu and David Bailey, “The single economic entity doctrine”, Common Market 
Law Review 51, no. 6 (2014): 1735.
31 Guidelines, paragraph 19.
32 Guidelines, paragraph 20.
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2.2. Agency agreements and EU competition law – the most relevant cases
Having clarified the status of the art on agency agreements, we now pro-
vide a brief summary of the relevant precedents of the Commission and 
the ECJ on agency agreements. 
We do so with particular emphasis on the criteria employed by the 
Commission and the ECJ in the context of the assessment. This will help a 
better understanding of the debate on the so-called integration criterion.
The Commission issued its first notice on agency agreements in 1962. 
At the time the notice was issued, the 1962 enforcement regulation33 had 
just entered into force and the first Commission decision on a competi-
tion case had not been published yet.34 However, surprisingly enough, the 
1962 notice set a number of principles that have remained unaltered to 
the present day. For instance, the definition of agents included in the 1962 
notice is basically the same adopted by the Guidelines, with minor lexi-
cal variations.35 Furthermore, the 1962 notice already considered the risk-
allocation criterion as the key factor to distinguish between agents and 
independent intermediaries.36 The risks material to the assessment were 
similar as well – the 1962 notice gave relevance to what the Guidelines 
would call “contract-specific investments” and “market-specific invest-
ments”. Finally, if a certain agreement qualified as an agency agreement 
under the notice, it was considered not to “fall under the prohibition in 
Article 85(1) of the Treaty”. 
The judgements rendered by the ECJ on the basis of the 1962 notice have 
significant commonalities. While the 1962 notice – just like the Guidelines 
– embraced an early risk-centred assessment, the ECJ adopted a functional 
33 See Council Regulation 17/62/EEC, First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the 
Treaty, OJ 013, 21/02/1962, pp. 0204-0211.
34 See decision 64/233/CEE, Décision de la Commission, du 11 mars 1964, relative à une demande 
d’attestation négative présentée conformément à l’article 2 du règlement nº 17 du Conseil (IV/A-
00061 - Grosfillex-Fillistorf), OJ 58, 9.4.1964, pp. 915-916. For an analysis of the early Commission 
practice, see the review by Martin Carree, Andrea Guesnter, and Martin P. Schinkel, “European 
antitrust policy 1957-2004: An analysis of Commission decisions”, Review of Industrial 
Organization 36, no. 2 (2010): 97-131.
35 See page 1 of the notice.
36 Under the 1962 notice, the “decisive criterion” to differentiate between the two was the “respon-
sibility for the financial risk bound up with the sale or with the performance of the contract”. The 
“decisive criterion” has later become the “determining factor” foreseen by the Guidelines, whereas 
the “financial risk bound up” with the performance of the tasks assigned by the principal has 
become the “financial or commercial risk” born “in relation to the activities for which it has been 
appointed as an agent”. Yet, the conceptual framework is unchanged.
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approach. The focus of the ECJ was on the relationship between the prin-
cipal and its agent(s) – if the agent performed an auxiliary function com-
pared to the principal and was integrated within the principal’s undertak-
ing, an agency relationship was deemed to arise regardless of a full-fledged 
risk assessment. The ECJ thus gave birth to the so-called “integration 
criterion”. 
The first relevant judgement is the notorious Consten-Gruding.37 The ECJ 
rejected Grundig’s argument according to which the 1962 notice had to 
apply seamlessly to independent distributors and agents because they both 
play the same economic role in the market (i.e. in both cases there is one 
offeror on the market, either the distributor or the agent). The Court rather 
held that “two marketing organizations, one of which is integrated into the 
manufacturer’s undertaking whilst the other is not, may not necessarily 
have the same efficiency. The wording of Article 85 causes the prohibition 
to apply […] to an agreement between several undertakings. Thus it does 
not apply where a sole undertaking integrates its sole distribution network 
into its business organization”.38 No mention of risk. It was just a matter 
of integration.
The EC then referred to the rationale of Consten-Gruding in Pittsburgh 
Corning.39 The Commission dismissed the parties’ claim that the 1962 
note on agency agreements had to be applied because the alleged agent 
was not “economically dependent” from Pittsburgh Corning Europe. In 
this respect, the Commission considered that the alleged agent’s revenues 
mainly came from the sale of its own products rather than from its activ-
ity as an (alleged) agent. Furthermore, the alleged agent was part of a large 
multinational group and had the economic strength and independence 
necessary to behave independently from its alleged principal. Therefore, 
the Commission concluded that the alleged agent did not perform the 
auxiliary function referred to by the 1962 notice and the Grundig-Consten 
case. No mention of the risk criterion. This is all the more surprising 
because, had it applied a pure risk-based criterion, the Commission would 
37 Judgement of 13 July 1966, Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. 
Commission of the European Economic Community, C-56/64, ECLI:EU:C:1966:41. For an early 
commentary on the judgement, See Lawrence F. Ebb, “The Grundig-Consten case revisited: 
Judicial harmonization of national law and treaty law in the common market”, University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 115, no. 6 (1967): 855-889.
38 Judgement of 13 July 1966, Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. 
Commission of the European Economic Community, C-56/64, ECLI:EU:C:1966:41, p.340.
39 See the decision of 23 November 1972, Pittsburgh Corning Europe, OJ 1972 L 272, p.35.
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have arguably concluded that the agreement was one of agency, as the 
alleged agent did not bear any financial or commercial risk.
The following evolutionary step was Suiker Unie.40 The ECJ considered 
that “if the agreements entered into between the principal and his agents 
[…] confer upon these agents or allow them to perform duties which from 
an economic point of view are approximately the same as those carried 
out by an independent dealer, because they provide for the said agents 
accepting the financial risks of the sale or of the performance of contracts 
entered into with third parties […] the agents cannot be regarded as auxil-
iary organs forming an integral part of the principal’s undertaking”.
The risk allocation criterion thus made its debut in the case law of the 
ECJ. However, when the ECJ unravelled its reasoning, it actually referred 
to the Pittsburgh Corning rationale: “the agents in question are large busi-
ness houses, which at the same time as they distribute sugar for the account 
of the applicant […] undertake a very considerable amount of business for 
their own account on the sugar market”.41 As Lianos put it, “the Court 
reaffirmed the importance of the criterion of the allocation of risks as an 
element distinguishing the situation of a commercial agent from that of an 
independent trader, but avoided examining the allocation of risks between 
the parties. It focused instead on the economic function of the representa-
tives and concluded that the agreements were not genuine commercial 
agencies and could infringe Article [101 (1)]”.42 
The integration criterion had its peak with Flemish agents.43 The Court 
stated that “a travel agent of the kind referred to by the national court must 
be regarded as an independent agent wo provides services on an entirely 
independent basis. He sells travel organized by a large number of different 
tour operators and a tour operator sells travel through a very large number 
40 Judgement of 16 December 1975, Coöperatieve Vereniging “Suiker Unie” UA and others v. 
Commission of the European Communities, Joined cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114-73, 
ECLI:EU:C:1975:174.
41 Judgement of 16 December 1975, Coöperatieve Vereniging “Suiker Unie” UA and others v. 
Commission of the European Communities, Joined cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114-73, 
ECLI:EU:C:1975:174, paragraph 544.
42 Ioannis Lianos, “Commercial Agency Agreements, vertical restraints, and the limits of article 
81(1) EC: Between hierarchies and networks”, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 3, no. 4 
(2007).
43 Judgement of 1 October 1987, VZW Vereniging van Vlaamse Reisbureaus v. VZW Sociale Dienst 
van de Plaatselijke en Gewestelijke Overheidsdiensten, case C-311/85, ECLI:EU:C:1987:41.
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of agents […] a travel agent cannot be treated as an auxiliary organ form-
ing an integral part of a tour operator’s undertaking”.
The integration criterion at its best – given that travel agents simultane-
ously offer their services to multiple principals, they are not integrated into 
their principals’ businesses. Therefore, they cannot be qualified as agents. 
The importance of the integration criterion in the early case law is con-
firmed by the draft 1990 notice of the EC on commercial agency agree-
ments. While the draft was never adopted, it provides helpful insights for 
the purposes of this article. The Commission considered the integration 
criterion as a viable one. An intermediary qualified as an independent 
trader “unless activity on his own behalf is ancillary to activity on behalf of 
his principal”. An intermediary was qualified as an agent insofar as it did 
not “take over most of the typical functions of the principal”, like “where 
the commercial agent determines the principal’s product and marketing 
strategy in respect of the product distributed under the agency agreement, 
thereby relegating the principal to the position of a subcontractor”. The 
integration test was considered to be met not only when “the agent has a 
particularly intensive link with the principal which […] leads customers or 
suppliers with whom the agent deals not to expect autonomous commer-
cial behavior from the agent but to identify him with the principal”, but 
also when the agent’s interests outside the agency relationship were limited 
and did not interfere with the subject matter of the agency agreement (i.e. 
where they did not conflict with the duty of loyalty of the agent under the 
agreement, for instance carrying competing product ranges). 
The mid-nineties represent a major shift in the approach towards the 
assessment of agency agreements. From 1995 to 2006, the Commission 
and the ECJ gradually abandoned the integration criterion to embrace the 
risk-centred approach. 
In 1995, the ECJ rendered its preliminary ruling in Volkswagen.44 The 
ECJ considered that “representatives can lose their character as independ-
ent traders if they do not bear any of the risks resulting from the con-
tracts negotiated on behalf of the principal and they operate as auxiliary 
organs forming an integral part of the principal’s undertaking”. In the 
case at stake, “the […] dealers assume, at least in part, the financial risks 
linked to the transactions concluded on behalf of VAG Leasing, in so far 
44 Judgement of 24 October 1995, Bundeskartellamt v. Volkswagen AG and VAG Leasing GmbH, 
C-266/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:345.
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as they repurchase the vehicles from it upon the expiry of the leasing con-
tracts. Furthermore, their principal business of sales and after-sales ser-
vices is carried on, largely independently, in their own name and for their 
own account”. In sum, “no reference was made to the possible economic 
dependence of the dealers towards Volkswagen or to the fact that the deal-
ers worked exclusively for Volkswagen and not for other car suppliers. The 
Court instead focused on the criterion of financial risks”.45 
In 2000, the Commission finally issued its revised vertical guidelines.46 
The impact of the 2000 guidelines on the assessment of agency agree-
ments was quite significant – for instance, the 2000 guidelines introduced 
the notion of genuine agent. For the purposes of this article, suffice it to 
say that the 2000 guidelines clarified that “it is not material for the assess-
ment whether the agent acts for one or several principals”. The integration 
criterion had officially been dropped. As Goffinet and Puel put it, the inte-
gration criterion “was not consistent with the pro-competitive objective 
of making it possible for agents to work for several principals (ie fostering 
inter-brand competition or competition between brands/products of dif-
ferent suppliers). Therefore, as a matter of policy, the Commission gave 
[it] up”.47
The first relevant judgement after the 2000 guidelines is Daimler 
Chrysler.48 Daimler Chrysler argued before the EC that its dealers could 
be qualified as genuine agents. The Commission sharply rejected the argu-
ment because “the criterion of integration is, unlike risk allocation, not a 
separate criterion for distinguishing a commercial agent from a dealer”. 
Interestingly enough, the footnote accompanying this statement refers to 
paragraph 19 of Volkswagen, which in turn referred to paragraph 539 of 
Suiker Unie – and that, despite the fact that both those judgements came to 
a different conclusion on the integration criterion! The Commission also 
argued that (i) Volkswagen had to be interpreted as meaning that the ECJ 
no longer treated the criterion of “integration” as being a separate concept 
from that of risk sharing and (ii) Suiker Unie confirmed the trend as the 
ECJ held that an agent could be treated as being “integrated” in the under-
taking of his principal if he did bear certain risks. The Commission also 
45 Lianos, “Commercial Agency”, 11.
46 See Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (2000/C 291/01).
47 Goffinet and Puel, “Impact of the internet”, 246.
48 Judgement of 15 September 2005, DaimlerChrysler AG v. Commission of the European 
Communities, T-325/01, ECLI:EU:T:2005:322.
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curtly considered that “the judgment of the Court of Justice in [Flemish 
Agents] bears no relevance to the resolution of these proceedings, as the 
facts which arose in that case differ from those which arise in the present 
dispute”.
The General Court (“GC”) put significant emphasis on the analysis of 
risks. More specifically, the GC considered inter alia that the agent had 
“no authority with regard to the price of the vehicle” and that it did not 
bear material, financial or commercial risks, including the ones related to 
transport of vehicles. Therefore, the ECJ concluded that those entities had 
to be considered agents: “the commercial freedom of a German agent in 
relation to the sale of Mercedes-Benz vehicles is extremely limited, so that 
he is not in the position to influence competition on the market in question 
[…] it is clear […] that […] it is Mercedes-Benz, and not its German agents, 
which determines the conditions applying to all car sales, in particular the 
sale price, and which bears the principal risks”.
The issue was not settled yet. The ECJ would intervene again in the 
Spanish cases dealing with commercial agency agreements concluded 
between service-station operators and oil companies in Spain. It is what 
has been called “the Repsol Saga”.49
In 2006, the ECJ delivered its judgement in CEPSA.50 According to the 
Court, “when an intermediary […] while having separate legal personal-
ity, does not independently determine his conduct on the market since he 
depends entirely on his principal […] because the latter assumes the finan-
cial and commercial risks as regards the economic activity concerned, 
the prohibition laid down in Article [101 TFEU] is not applicable to the 
relationship between that intermediary and the principal”. Therefore, the 
“decisive factor” for the purposes of determining whether a service-sta-
tion operator is an independent economic operator is to be found in the 
assumption of the financial and commercial risks linked to sales of goods 
to third parties. The ECJ also set out the criteria enabling an assessment to 
be made as to the actual allocation of the financial and commercial risks. 
The assessment should take account, “first, of the risks linked to the sale 
of the goods […] and, second, of the risks linked to investments specific 
to the market”. Interestingly enough, AG Kokott considered in a footnote 
49 Pablo Ibanez Colomo, “The ‘Repsol saga’: Background note on ‘genuine’ agency agreements in 
Spanish competition law”, e-Competitions I, no. 503 (2016).
50 Judgement of 14 December 2006, Confederación Española de Empresarios de Estaciones de 
Servicio v Compañía Española de Petróleos SA, C-217/05, ECLI:EU:C:2006:784.
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of her opinion that “the judgement in Volkswagen and VAG Leasing […] 
should not be understood as meaning that whether the agent is assimilated 
into his principal’s undertaking and whether the principal bears the risk of 
the transactions are two different, independent criteria […] in the market 
for the sale of the principal’s goods, the agent’s assimilation into the prin-
cipal’s undertaking and the principal’s bearing of the transactional risks 
are two sides of the same coin”. We respectfully disagree – the wording of 
the judgements makes it clear that the two criteria were considered cumu-
lative. In any case, as discussed under Section 4.1, the issue is not material 
for the purposes of this article.
More recently, the GC dealt with agency agreements in Voestalpine.51 
The agency issue arose because one of the agents that took part in the 
allegedly anti-competitive meetings did so for more than one principal. 
However, the GC stated that “the double representation […] cannot upset 
the finding that, so far as the activities entrusted […] were concerned, [the 
agent] was not in a position to carry out duties economically compara-
ble with those of an independent trader”. The GC also considered that “in 
order to determine the existence of an economic unit between the agent 
and one of his principals, it is necessary to ascertain whether that agent is 
in a position, as regards the activities entrusted to him by that principal, to 
act as an independent trader free to determine his own business strategy. 
If the agent is not in a position to act in that way, the function which he 
carries out on behalf of the principal form an integral part of the latter’s 
activities”. 
In recent years, the issue of whether online platforms can be considered 
agents has been brought to the attention of several competition authorities. 
In some instances, the authorities (whether or not consciously…) moved 
the focus of the case to other issues. This was the case in the E-book before 
the Commission.52 The Commission focused on the alleged horizontal 
cooperation between the parties rather than facing the agency issue before 
closing the case with commitments. The second precedent worth mention-
ing is the German Hotel booking case.53 A number of national competition 
51 Judgement of 15 July 2015, Voestalpine AG and Voestalpine Wire Rod Austria GmbH v. European 
Commission, T-418/10, ECLI:EU:T:2015:516.
52 Case COMP/AT.39847 E-Books of 12 December 2012.
53 Bundeskartellamt, Decision of 20 December 2013, HRS-Hotel Reservation Service, avail-
able at https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidung/EN/Entscheidungen/
Kartellverbot/B9-66-10.pdf%3F__blob%3DpublicationFile%26v%3D33. 
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authorities started investigations concerning online sales of hotel book-
ings. The key issue was whether price parity clauses requiring hotels to 
offer the same or a better room price on Booking.com’s platform as they 
offered on their other sales channels were compliant with EU competi-
tion law. The French, Italian, Swedish and German competition authori-
ties started parallel investigations under the oversight of the Commission. 
The German case went further. The Bundeskartellamt considered that 
HRS cannot qualify as a genuine agent and adopted a prohibition deci-
sion against the German OTA Hotel Reservation Service (“HRS”). The 
Regional Court of Düsseldorf subsequently confirmed the HSR decision 
on appeal.54 
3. To be agents or not to be agents, this is the question
In light of the principles described under Section 2, we now turn to the 
question that lies at the heart of this article – can online platforms be qual-
ified as agents under EU competition law?
The answer depends on whether online platforms meet the constituent 
elements described under Section 2, i.e. whether they fall under the notion 
of agents and bear the risks that are given relevance by the Guidelines.
3.1. The notion of agent
We believe that online platforms can fall under the notion of agents 
adopted by the Guidelines. As discussed in Section 2, according to the 
Guidelines agents are (i) legal or physical persons that are (ii) vested with 
the power to negotiate and/or conclude contracts on behalf of the princi-
pal, either in the agent’s own name or in the name of the principal, (iii) for 
the sale or purchase of goods or services by or from the principal.
It goes without saying that online platforms can be legal persons. 
Moreover, online platforms can be granted the power to negotiate and/or 
conclude contracts on behalf of their principal(s).
To take a famous example, under Booking.com’s terms and conditions, 
the company provides an online platform “through which [providers of 
accommodation services] can advertise, market, sell, promote and/or offer 
[…] their products and services […] visitors of the platform can discover, 
54 See Oberlandesgerichts Düsseldorf, “HRS-Hotelbuchungsportal: ʽBestpreisklauseln’ kartell-
rechtswidrig und damit unzulässig”.
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search, compare and make an order, reservation, purchase or payment”.55 
By making a reservation on Booking.com, users enter into an agreement 
with providers of the accommodation service (i.e. not with the platform, 
but through the platform – ubiquitous relationships!). Borrowing from the 
Guidelines, Booking.com is granted the power to negotiate contracts on 
behalf of its (thousands of) principals.
The first step is met.
3.2. Risks material to the assessment 
As discussed under Section 2, the Guidelines give relevance to three types 
of financial or commercial risks. Contract-specific risks and market-spe-
cific assessments will be assessed below. The issue of risks related “to other 
activities undertaken by the agent on the same product market” is not of 
immediate relevance to this article – we believe it is unlikely that princi-
pals would require online platforms to invest in after-sales services as they 
are usually provided by the principals themselves.
(a) Contract-specific risks
Contract-specific risks are risks “directly related to the contracts con-
cluded and/or negotiated by the agent on behalf of the principal”. In prac-
tice, this means that these risks arise directly from the contractual rela-
tionships that the agent seeks to build on behalf of its principal. 
A typical example of contract-specific risk is the inventory risk, i.e. the 
chance that the agent will not manage to sell the contract product and shall 
keep it in stock. This would in turn decrease the contract product’s value 
and/or increase the agent’s costs to keep its stock. Overcoming contract-
specific risks normally does not help the agent to conclude other contracts. 
For instance, overcoming the inventory risk through the sale of the con-
tract products will allow the agent to free up capacity to sell other prod-
ucts, but will not make the agent more attractive in the context of future 
negotiations for the same products. 
To take a famous example, the Bundeskartellamt considered that, in the 
hotel accommodation sector, contract-specific investments are those aris-
ing from a single contractual relationship with a certain hotel company 
that cannot be used for the distribution of accommodation services of 
other hotel companies. 
55 https://www.booking.com/content/terms.en-gb.html.
M&CLR_IV_2.indd   95 28/10/2020   23:06:52
96  Market and Competition Law Review / volume iv / no. 2 / october 2020 / 75-111
In our view, contract-specific risks in the realm of online platforms tend 
to be limited or non-existent. First, online platforms rarely bear inventory 
risks and the related costs. As discussed under Section 1, more and more 
often the end product that is placed on the market is an intangible pack-
age of services. Therefore, financing of contract-specific stocks is often not 
required. Second, online platforms often rely on secured payment meth-
ods. Therefore, they rarely bear the risk of unsuccessful payment. Third, 
even when such risks exist, they entail negligible costs. An example could 
be the cost borne by an online platform to advertise one specific product. 
As will be discussed in detail below, most of the expenditure of online 
platforms aims at improving the platform itself. Once the platform is up 
and running, the cost of advertising one specific product is so limited that 
it likely amounts to a “non-significant risk” under the Guidelines.56
This has been confirmed by the Bundeskartellamt in the HRS decision. 
As discussed under Section 2, the authority ultimately considered that HRS 
cannot be considered an agent for competition law purposes. However, it 
still acknowledged that “the contract-specific investments of the relevant 
hotel portal, i.e., the investments that arise only on the basis of the contrac-
tual relationship with a certain hotel company and cannot be used for the 
distribution of accommodation services of other hotel companies, such as 
investments in photos and text processing, are relatively low”.57
We agree with this proposition. As discussed below, an online booking 
platform arguably invests much more money in making sure that users 
find its interface appealing and the platform is adequately sponsored rather 
than in sponsoring one single hotel. To advocate the opposite is to disre-
gard the functioning of an online platform. As discussed under Section 
1, online platforms aim at stimulating as many interactions as they can. 
Investing in a single transaction, e.g. in selling a single hotel room, is at 
odds with the ordinary functioning of online platforms.
56 As discussed under Section 2, the Guidelines do not clarify what is meant by “significant”. This 
creates a relevant loophole in the assessment envisaged by the Guidelines. For an example of how 
the significance of risks can influence the assessment, see the French Mango case, Case 09-D-23 
of 30 June 2009. Further guidance on this point as a result of the review of the Guidelines would 
be welcome.
57 Decision B 9-121/13, page 83.
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(b) Market-specific investments
The second prong of the risk test is more controversial. Do online plat-
forms bear (material) market-specific investments? This is the subject of 
heated discussion among commentators, who focused mainly on the role 
played by advertising expenditure. Before diving into the issue, it is help-
ful to remind that market-specific investments under the Guidelines are 
those specifically required for the type of activity for which the agent has 
been appointed by the principal. These investments are usually sunk. For 
instance, an intermediary would be found to bear market-specific invest-
ments if it was forced by the principal to purchase demonstration products 
(e.g. demonstration vehicles for a car dealer). These would be sunk costs 
required to perform the kind of activity for which the intermediary has 
been appointed (e.g. selling cars).
The Staff Working Document accompanying the Report from the 
Commission on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry (“SWD”) is a good start-
ing point for the analysis.58 The Commission considered under paragraph 
321 that “the online retail investments costs that are most referred to are 
the costs of promoting the website, including search engine optimization, 
platform commissions and online advertising, the costs (including human 
resources and software) of creating and maintaining the website, costs of 
maintaining a full online (interactive) catalogue on all websites, for all lan-
guage versions, the costs of a call centre”. While the list is not necessarily 
exhaustive and the concept of “costs” is not exactly the same as “invest-
ments”, paragraph 321 helps framing the analysis – all the cost items listed 
under paragraph 321 amount to market-specific investments under the 
Guidelines.
First, the Commission gives relevance to the costs “(including human 
resources […]) of creating and maintaining the website […] the costs of 
a call-centre”. The cost of the human factor under the SWD echoes the 
Guidelines’ “investments in […] training of personnel”. While it is true that 
online platforms carry the cost of their workforce, in our view such cost 
does not amount to a market-specific investment under the Guidelines. As 
the Commission itself considers in the SWD, investments in the workforce 
are aimed at “creating and maintaining the website” – the bulk of work-
force investments does not go into hiring and training personnel with an 
58 See Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the document Report from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – Final Report on the E-commerce 
Sector Inquiry COM (2017) 229 final.
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expertise in providing the underlying service. Roughly speaking, Booking.
com does not need to hire personnel that can sell hotel rooms. Its person-
nel must be versed in creating and maintaining the platform.59
Second, the Commission refers to the costs of “search engine optimiza-
tion […] maintaining a full online (interactive) catalogue on all websites, 
for all language versions”. These costs lie at the heart of the functioning of 
an online platform. Maintaining an updated, well-functioning and appeal-
ing platform is the key to attract users on both sides of the platform and to 
keep the platform value system working. Investing in the functioning and 
appeal of the platform is to online platforms as investing in the premises is 
to brick and mortar retailers. 
The fact that online platforms spend a lot of money to maintain and 
update the platform is beyond doubt. The EU Industrial R&D Investment 
Scoreboard is a good proxy.60 According to the report, Amazon, i.e., an 
online platform, would likely be the company with the highest expendi-
ture in R&D in 2018/2019. However, the Commission lacked hard data to 
support this view.61 Not a big deal for the purposes of this article – the first 
place in the report is still occupied by an online platform. Over the last 15 
years, 8 companies have moved up in the global ranking by 70 or more 
places – 5 of these 8 companies operate online platforms (the other 3 being 
active in the pharmaceutical sector). In general, R&D expenditure is domi-
nated by companies active in the ICT sector – the only other sectors that 
can compete in terms of expenditure are pharmaceutical and automotive. 
This suggests that online platforms tend to spend considerable amounts of 
money in their own infrastructures.
The relevance of market-specific investments to online platforms has 
been confirmed by the Bundeskartellamt in Booking. According to the 
authority, Booking’s “advertising investments, for instance in the form of 
buying advertising space, of paying for a high ranking on Google or other 
metasearch engines or by pay-per-click payments […] to the metasearch 
engines are extremely high […] only its pay-per-click expenses for Google 
and other metasearch engines in Germany constitute between [30 and 
60%] of its German commission sales from bookings that result from PPC 
advertising for Google and other metasearch engines […] to the extent that 
59 See also Akman, “Online platforms”, 250.
60 The 2019 edition of the EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard is available at https://iri.jrc.
ec.europa.eu/scoreboard/2019-eu-industrial-rd-investment-scoreboard. 
61 See page 6 of the report.
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Booking, by contrast, makes such general, non-contract specific invest-
ments, they serve in particular to improve its image and increase its popu-
larity as such. Consequently, these investments are not lost for Booking”.62 
Where does it leave us? Does it mean that online platforms bear signifi-
cant market-specific investments, thus losing their qualification as online 
agents? We do not think this is the case. R&D/maintenance expenditure 
and similar cost items do not amount to a market-specific investment. 
These are rather platform-specific investments. Investing in an online plat-
form’s mechanics does not mean investing in the specific “type of activity 
for which the agent has been appointed by the principal”. Keeping an algo-
rithm up and running is not equal to investing in the sale of hotel rooms or 
videogames.63 These investments are necessary in an online environment 
regardless of the underlying service – as discussed under Section 1, online 
platforms work well insofar as they manage to attract users and to offer a 
comprehensive experience, thanks to which users can interact with each 
other and create value. 
The idea that these are market-specific investments is premised on the 
misconception that online platforms create value as a result of a pipeline 
value-chain model, where R&D/maintenance expenditure is factored into 
the value chain, applied to the input and pushed down the chain until the 
end product is created. This is not how online platforms work – online 
platforms proliferate insofar as they manage to facilitate a multitude of 
interactions between their users. R&D/maintenance expenditure is not 
what allows the online platform to place a product or a service on the 
market. It is what allows the online platform to enable those interactions. 
To borrow from the Guidelines, R&D/maintenance expenditure is what 
makes the platform more competitive in the market for agency services by 
investing in an infrastructure. Thanks to R&D/maintenance expenditure, 
an online platform increases its chances to be picked as an agent by the 
principal and/or to intermediate transactions with final customers.
As discussed, often the end product of an online platform is not a good, 
but a package of services incorporating a good and a service provided by 
the platform. R&D/maintenance is what allows the online platform to add 
the service bit of the package on top of the good/service provided by the 
principal. The example of gaming platforms comes in handy again. These 
62 Decision B 9-121/13, page 84.
63 See Akman, “Online platforms”.
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platforms do not merely allow end users to purchase video games. They 
offer a comprehensive gaming experience made of playing a video game, 
interacting with other users through a webchat and improving the gam-
ing experience through in-game purchases. These other services are the 
platform’s added value. These investments are not aimed at selling vide-
ogames. They are aimed at selling the platform to both users and video 
game developers. 
Finally, the Commission considers that online platforms carry “online 
advertising” costs. This is the heart of the issue. The very definition of 
online platforms as agents depends on how to allocate online advertising 
costs – are these market-specific investments or are these platform-specific 
investments? 
It has been argued that they are market-specific investments. After all, 
online platforms’ expenditure for online advertising is almost as high as 
their R&D expenditure. Online platforms often incur significant costs for 
different forms of advertising, including pay-per-click advertisements. For 
instance, Booking.com has been identified as the main spender for pay-
per-click advertisement in the entire travel sector.64 “Hotels” is reported to 
be “keyword with the highest spending”, whereas “accommodation tops 
the keyword charts, but the battleground is for cheap holidays”. 
Hedeström and Peeperkorn confirm that advertising costs are crucial to 
the assessment. They believe that “market-specific investments will gener-
ally be significant for on-line platforms, such as investments to create, main-
tain and update their specialized website to be active on a particular market. 
It is, in particular, difficult to imagine how these market-specific investment 
costs and risks can be transferred to the supplier, if other suppliers’ products 
are also sold on the same distributor’s website”.65 Goffinet and Puel consider 
that “there is no certainty as to whether sunk investments in the advertising 
of the agent’s distribution services (such as ‘Google AdWords’ in relation to 
the brand of the agent) also constitute (i) risks that are related to the activity 
of providing agency services in general, or (ii) market-specific risks. On the 
one hand, as these investments have a significant influence on the success of 
the agent, they could be considered as risks related to the activity of provid-
ing agency services in general. On the other hand, as these investments are 
64 https://www.retailtimes.co.uk/booking-com-leads-the-big-spenders-for-ppc-in-the-travel-
sector/. 
65 Hedeström and Peeperkorn, “Vertical restraints”, 18.
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sunk and cannot be recouped (cannot be sold without significant losses), 
they could be considered as market-specific risks”.66 
We believe that online advertising costs do not amount to market spe-
cific investments. Online platforms do not invest in advertising to be able 
“to conclude and/or negotiate” contracts on behalf of their principal. 
Advertising expenditure is an inherent feature of any online platform. 
The latter must invest in advertising, with specific regard to pay per click 
advertising, in order to be able to provide their (agency) services – absent 
these investments, online platforms would not manage to offer interme-
diation services to their principals at all. Online platforms survive insofar 
as they manage to gather as many users as they can on both (or on all) sides 
of the platform – pay per click advertising is key to enable users to gather 
on the platform. This is key for the platform to gain users, regardless of the 
package of services that is ultimately sold on the market. 
Furthermore, it seems to us that the whole debate on platforms having 
significant market power, risk of market tipping and the need to regulate 
gatekeeping platforms provides an argument in favour of considering 
that online platforms bear significant platform-specific investments (as 
opposed to market-specific investments). The Progress Report from the 
Expert Group for the Observatory on the Online Platform Economy on 
Differentiated Treatment67 considers that online platforms’ expansion “is 
not constrained by costly investments as in the case of supermarkets, as 
platforms do not need to invest in the production of the contents, goods or 
services or other forms of capital they give access to”.68 The debate on gate-
keeping platforms focuses on the purportedly significant scale advantages 
enjoyed by online platforms. This is another evidence of the absence of 
market-specific investments – as pointed out in the report, “platforms […] 
can decide to start selling the exact same product as offered by a business 
user […] this way, without taking the same risk, the platform can compete 
intensely with businesses who took the risk in growing a market for a prod-
uct whose success among consumers was not yet established at the initial 
launch of the product in the platform”. In other words, the Commission is 
concerned about the ability of gatekeeping platforms to expand in neigh-
bouring markets by leveraging on data and on the scale effects they enjoy 
66 Goffinet and Puel, “Impact of the internet”, 245. See also Jung, “European Union”.
67 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/commission-expert-group-publishes-pro-
gress-reports-online-platform-economy. 
68 See page 7 of the Report.
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on their market of origin. The very fact that online platforms can seam-
lessly kick-off another activity in a neighbouring market proves that they 
do not need to incur significant market-specific investments to start oper-
ating or to expand on a certain market. The Commission does not consider 
that market-specific advertisement costs could be an issue for platforms 
expanding in neighbouring markets and is right to do so. The platform 
does not bear any of them – it just leverages on the advertisement invest-
ments it incurred for the purpose of existing as a platform.
In sum, we do not think that online platforms bear (significant) market-
specific investments. We respectfully submit that arguing the contrary 
means confusing two different assessments. On the one hand, there are 
risks in the market for the contract products. On the other hand, there 
are risks in the market for agency services. What most of the commenta-
tors define as “market-specific investments” are actually platform-specific 
investments. They have little to do with the activities for which the plat-
form is appointed by the principal(s). But they have a lot to do with making 
the platform more attractive on the market for agency services. 
Our impression is that the tendency to confuse market-specific invest-
ments and platform-specific investments is due to the perceived need to 
look into the competitive dynamics occurring at the platform’s level. If 
online platforms were considered agents, competition authorities would be 
deprived of the opportunity to check whether something competitively rel-
evant is happening due to the exemption from the application of Article 101 
TFEU. While this is an understandable policy goal, this should be achieved 
through a consistent enforcement of the applicable legal framework. 
Arguing that online platforms bear market-specific investments means 
over-stretching the boundaries of the notion of market-specific investments 
in order to bring online platforms back to the realm of Article 101 TFEU.
4. What next?
The Commission is currently reviewing the rules applicable to verti-
cal agreements, i.e. the VBER and the Guidelines. The review process is 
divided into two steps: (i) the evaluation phase and (ii) the impact assess-
ment phase. The goal of the evaluation phase is to gather evidence on the 
functioning of the VBER and the Guidelines. This phase also features a 
public consultation to allow interested stakeholders to take part in the 
process. It will draw on the outcome of the e-commerce sector inquiry as 
well as on the enforcement experience of the Commission and of national 
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competition authorities. The impact assessment phase aims at informing 
and supporting the decision of the Commission to determine whether it 
should let the VBER lapse, prolong its duration or revise it based on the 
evidence gathered during the evaluation phase.69
The relevant submissions have been published on the Commission’s 
website. Interestingly enough, a significant number of contributors raise 
the issue of the lack of clarity surrounding agency agreements, with par-
ticular regard to the deficiencies that the current rules prove to have when 
coping with the technological development. The most interesting input 
came from national competition authorities. According to their submis-
sion, “there seem to be diverging views among NCAs as to whether [online 
platforms] can qualify as genuine agents. Some NCAs consider that certain 
characteristics of online platforms indicate that they cannot form an inte-
gral part of the principal’s distribution system and should therefore not be 
treated as genuine agents […] other NCAs take the view that, depending 
on the circumstances, online platforms could qualify as an agent, with the 
result that Article 101(1) TFEU does not apply to intra-brand restrictions 
agreed between the platform and the principal”. In light of the above, the 
national competition authorities “advocate for more guidance on relevant 
factors to be taken into account in the assessment whether online plat-
forms can qualify as agents, which should be carried out on a case-by-
case basis [taking] into account the following aspects: (i) in some circum-
stances online platforms appear to bear more than insignificant risks; (ii) 
the nature of the relationship between suppliers and online platforms is 
very different from a traditional agency model where large suppliers act 
as principals using various smaller (independent) sales agents to sell their 
goods or services”.70 
As discussed earlier, we believe that the review of the legal framework 
applicable to vertical agreements is in fact an opportunity not to be missed 
to fill the gaps of the current framework. We provide a few thoughts below.
4.1. Re-discovering the integration criterion. Viable option or siren song?
As discussed under Section 2, there are a number of early precedents 
(e.g. Consten-Grundig, Pittsburg Corning and Flemish Agents) that give 
relevance to the integration criterion. However, since the Nineties the 
69 https://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2018_vber/index_en.html. 
70 See the Summary of the contributions of the National Competition Authorities to the evaluation 
of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (EU) No. 330/2010.
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Commission has consistently interpreted the legal test to assess agency 
agreements as meaning that the integration criterion bears no relevance. 
As discussed under Section 2, this gave rise to a risk-centred approach that 
we believe allows us to conclude that online platforms can be considered 
agents under EU competition law.
Some Authors believe that the integration criterion has been unduly 
foregone by the Guidelines and that it should be re-discovered as it does 
not actually conflict with the Commission’s policy goals.71
We agree that the Guidelines left out Flemish Agents and the other cases 
giving relevance to the integration criterion. Therefore, we agree that 
bringing the integration criterion back to life would be legally sound. After 
all, the Court and the Commission have already endorsed this criterion. 
And they rightly did so – a few decades ago, agents could meaningfully be 
integrated within their principal’s business. Furthermore, re-discovering 
the integration criterion appears to be more sensitive than over-stretching 
the boundaries of the market-specific investment test. At first sight, the 
integration criterion would be the online platforms panacea – it would 
allow to rule out with certainty that online platforms can be qualified as 
agents and provide an answer to our questions. As discussed under Section 
1, the fact that online platforms get to have thousands of principals is an 
undeniable truth. It is in fact the very reason why they manage to provide 
services. However, we are not totally convinced with this line of thought.
First, from a legal perspective, in principle the ECJ’s preliminary rulings 
have no erga omnes value. It follows that, while preliminary rulings have 
a strong persuasive value, Flemish Agents does not create any per se obli-
gation to behave accordingly in similar cases. It is what the Commission 
argued in DaimlerChrysler. Furthermore, from the Nineties onwards both 
the Commission and the Court have denied that the integration criterion 
bears any relevance to the assessment. One may argue whether this is con-
sistent with the early case law, but from a policy perspective it would be 
hard to justify another U-turn to embrace a criterion in vogue before the 
Nineties.
Second, from a conceptual perspective, the integration criterion appears 
to be outdated. Agents are “no longer individuals walking from door to 
door with a bag of samples”.72 Agents – regardless of whether they are 
71 Goffinet and Puel, “Impact of the internet”.
72 Akman, “Online platforms”, 288.
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online platforms – are usually companies that will run their agency busi-
ness in an entrepreneurial manner. To borrow from the Commission’s lan-
guage, in Pittsburgh Corning (on which the GC drew in Voestalpine), mod-
ern agents often have the economic strength and independence to behave 
independently from their principals. Furthermore, as discussed above, 
it happens more and more that online platforms work with a significant 
number of principals and that in so doing they manage to gain more com-
petitive relevance than their principals. Performing the assessment based 
on whether these entities can be considered “auxiliary” or not is at the 
very minimum a naïve exercise. To borrow from well-reputed Authors, 
“these platforms seem very different from the classic agency model where 
a principal determines the commercial conditions under which an agent 
can sell its products because the principal takes responsibility for all the 
relevant costs and risks. Often, in the platform cases, the ‘agent’ is a large 
multinational, whose size and scope of activity may exceed those of its 
‘principal(s)’”. However, the Authors argue that “such a return to the aux-
iliary organ test is not necessary” because “under the financial and com-
mercial risk test it is highly unlikely that such platforms will qualify as 
‘genuine’ agents”.73 While we respectfully disagree with the last part, we 
agree that the integration criterion is of limited help to get a modern 
understanding of agency.
In sum, our view is that the Guidelines overlooked the early case law of 
the ECJ. This is a fact. However, dusting off the integration criterion for 
the purpose of assessing whether online platforms are agents would not 
solve the issue, as it would entail the application of an old-fashioned test to 
a dramatically modern issue.
4.2. Towards a different paradigm
If the current framework is not fit for purpose and the integration criterion 
does not help much, what is the possible way forward?
We believe that the competition assessment of agency agreement is in 
need of a drastic rethink. We provide a few thoughts below that we believe 
should inform the review process. 
73 Hedeström and Peeperkorn, “Vertical restraints”, 18.
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(a) Less form-based categories, more effects-based assessment
As discussed under Sections 1 and 3, the Guidelines embraced a stand-
ardised approach to agency agreements that does not capture the specifi-
cities of online platforms. Assessing online platforms against this back-
ground is tricky because the framework is not flexible enough to cope with 
platformisation. As some Authors rightly pointed out, “the vertical guide-
lines have many artificial form-based legal categories that justify different 
legal treatments, e.g. agency”.74 
As discussed under Section 1, online platforms physiologically multi-
ply the competitive dynamics a competition authority should look at. 
Principals compete among themselves. Online platforms compete among 
themselves. Online platforms sometimes compete with their principals. 
In the same way competition law aims at ensuring that fair competition 
occurs among principals, it also has to protect competition among plat-
forms and between principals and platforms. No restriction in passing on 
the commission should be permitted.
One of the main competitive variables when it comes to online plat-
forms is the price of the intermediation service, i.e. the commission that 
is charged by the platform. Commission-based competition must be safe-
guarded. As a result, we think it would be key for the revised Guidelines 
to introduce a distinction between the price of the product (that could be 
lawfully imposed by the principal on the platform) and the level of the 
commission, that must be up to the platform. Platforms must be free to 
determine the amount of their commission. 
To do so, we advocate to leave aside the form-based approach to agen-
cies. When dealing with vertical agreements involving online platforms, 
the adoption of a case-by-case approach is key. The first concern of a 
competition authority should be to understand the functioning of a plat-
form’s model. Then, the competition authority should be in the position 
to safeguard competition among the relevant actors. The adoption of a 
form-based approach under which, if an online platform is an agent, the 
merchant is automatically free to impose price and sales conditions to the 
platform does not allow competition authorities to ensure that compe-
tition is in place among platforms. An effects-based approach would be 
advisable.
74 See Aleksandra Boutin, “Vertical restraints and the digital world. Time for a more economic 
approach”, Slide presentation at GCLC Annual Conference, 2019.
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This evolution is actually coherent with the evolutionary path of compe-
tition law, with particular regard to vertical agreements. Before Regulation 
1/200375 removed the mandatory notification regime, the Commission was 
in dire need of a way to make the system procedurally sustainable – by 
the time the ECJ rendered its Grundig-Consten judgement,76 almost 35,000 
exclusive distribution agreements had been filed to the Commission for ex 
ante approval. The Commission initially embraced a form-based approach 
to streamline the assessment. Under certain conditions, some vertical 
agreements were block-exempted;77 others, including agency agreements, 
were said to fall outside the scope of competition rules. It was not until 
the 1997 Green Paper on vertical restraints78 that the effects-based revo-
lution started. The press release accompanying the Green Paper pointed 
out that “the current block exemptions [lack] flexibility […] and are over-
regulatory […] too much emphasis is put on analysis of clauses and not 
enough on the economic impact of the agreements”.79 The Green Paper 
thus paved the way for the 1999 block exemption regulation80 and to the 
2000 guidelines.81 The focus increasingly shifted to the effects of a certain 
conduct on the market and to the legal and economic context framing the 
assessment. This approach was substantially confirmed in the VBER and 
the Guidelines, with a few variations.82
In sum, EU policy towards vertical agreements has faced a multifaceted 
evolution. However, the rules on agency agreements have not followed the 
same path. The effects-based approach has not disrupted the assessment 
of agency agreements. Interestingly enough, the Green Paper expressly 
confirmed that it would not “cover […] commercial agents […] the focus 
75 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, pp. 1-25.
76 Judgement of 13 July 1996, Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH 
v. Commission of the European Economic Community, joined cases C-56 and C-58/64, 
ECLI:EU:C:1966:41.
77 Carree, Guesnter, and Schinkel, “European antitrust policy 1957-2004”, 111 consider that “verti-
cal restraints have a long history of block exemption regulations”.
78 Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy, COM(96) 721 final, 22 January 1997.
79 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp1997_002_en.html. 
80 See Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the application of 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, OJ L 336, 
29/12/1999 P. 0021 – 0025.
81 See Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (2000/C 291/01).
82 Like the extension of the 30% market share threshold to buyers.
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is primarily on vertical restraints in the distribution chain”.83 The first 
Commission notice on agency agreements was issued as early as 1962. The 
criteria to assess whether an agreement is one of agency have been slightly 
amended since then. However, the treatment of agency agreements under 
EU competition law has remained unchanged. Peeperkorn confirms that 
the entry into force of the VBER and the Guidelines brought “no funda-
mental change in policy with regard to agency agreements” compared to 
the 1999 block exemption regulation and to the 2000 guidelines, which in 
turn were drawn upon the previous rules.84
This alone should suggest that the rules on agency agreements would 
benefit from a refresh – “agents are no longer individuals walking from 
door to door with a bag of samples”.85 Lianos also commented that “it 
is […] remarkable that, despite this evolution towards a more economic 
approach, the agency agreements exception has remained untouched”.86 
In essence, assessing whether online platforms can be qualified as agents 
under EU competition law means applying rules conceived almost sixty 
years ago to a contemporary issue. This helps explaining the hurdles and 
inconsistencies of assessing the legal qualification of online platforms 
under the Guidelines.
We are now at a turning point similar to the one experienced in 1997 – 
the effects-based revolution must be extended to agency agreements.
(b) Abandoning the market-specific investments criterion
Against this background, old-fashioned concepts like market-specific 
investments should be abandoned as well. Any business incurs risks. As 
Akman put it, one should not confuse “the fact that the agency business 
has its own costs and risks itself as a business with the decision on whether 
the business acts as an agent of another party in a given transaction with 
a third party: the mere fact that an agency business has costs cannot dis-
qualify the business from being an agency”.87
As discussed, agents are more and more often companies that carry 
their own business. As a result, the Guidelines should not give relevance to 
83 See page 4.
84 Peeperkorn, “Revised EU competition rules”, in Kilpailuoikeudellinen Vuosikirja, ed. Artuu 
Mentula (Helsinki, 2010): 207.
85 Akman, “Online platforms”, 288.
86 Lianos, “Commercial Agency”, 4. The Author then concludes that “the specific regime for com-
mercial agency agreements is justified”.
87 Pinar Akman, “A competition law assessment”, 808.
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obsolete categories like market-specific investments, but to the economic 
reality of the alleged agent. In this respect, Akman suggests to make use 
of the fiduciary criterion borrowed from agency law – according to the 
Author, the new rules should provide that online platforms could be quali-
fied as agents insofar as their interests are aligned to the ones of their prin-
cipal. When they are not, e.g. because the platform is active in the same 
market of its principal, the agency rule could not be applied. The argument 
is robust and makes good legal sense. 
We would bring it even further – according to Voestalpine (which, as dis-
cussed under Section 2, ends up borrowing from Pittsburgh Corning and, 
to a certain extent, from the never adopted 1990 guidelines), the interme-
diary amounts to an agent if it is not in a position to act as an independent 
entity that is free to determine its own business strategy (i.e., to borrow 
from the 1990 notice, if it is not in the position to determine the principal’s 
product and marketing strategy, including most notably risks related to 
the sale of the product, not market-specific investments). In our view, a 
good way forward would be for the intermediary to lose its qualification as 
an agent if it was left free to determine its business conduct with reference 
to the contract products. This would apply regardless of whether the inter-
mediary would be pursuing its own interest or the principal’s (after all, 
a complete commonality of interests between principal and agent would 
always be a legal fictio). But if the intermediary was free to autonomously 
determine itself on the market, then something competitively relevant 
would be happening on the market for the contract products, as the agent 
would build up its own business strategy. In any case, the agent should be 
free to determine its commission and to pass it on to consumers if it so 
wishes.
This also means that an intermediary could be considered an agent 
within the context of a certain product and not of another. This is consist-
ent with certain precedents like Willis v. Office of Fair Trading, in which 
the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal ruled that an individual could qual-
ify as an agent for a certain conduct (provision of pricing information), but 
not for another (providing the cover price). As Odudu and Bailey pointed 
out, “this suggests a functional approach to the question of attributing 
liability for something that the agent has done on behalf of a principal”.88
88 Odudu and Bailey, “The single economic entity”, 1754.
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